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1 Introduction
Diﬀerent hypotheses have been proposed to explain the decline in household
saving rates that was seen in many countries in the mid-1980s, including UK
and the Nordic countries. The savings decline or ”consumption boom” in the
mid-1980s has been explained as an eﬀect of liberalization of the credit market,
and as a demand pull caused by increases in current and expected wealth. In the
first case, going from a constrained to an unconstrained credit market regime will
increase aggregate demand because available credit will satisfy pent-up demand
for durables and investment in housing. In the second case there may be little
eﬀective rationing, and an increase in consumption demand is simply a function
of an increase in current wealth and expected income. A rise in current wealth
may be caused by higher market value of assets such as housing, and an increase
in expected human capital may be due to revised expectations about future
income streams.
The two explanations have divergent implications for a number of policy
issues, the level of long run growth and the duration of current account deficits
being among the most prominent. In Norway, the strong rise in consumption of
durables and housing caused negative saving rates and a current account deficit.
This is more likely to be a temporary phenomenon when the cause is a reac-
tion to deregulation. If the main explanation is a revaluation of current wealth
or more optimistic expectations about future income, there may be more con-
cern for long run consequences, and even if the expectations are revised so that
the level of saving returns to a higher level, booms in the market value of real
assets will probably re-occur. This latter concern has motivated several stud-
ies to reconstruct the macro consumption relationship used in macroeconomic
forecasting models so as to be able to predict new slumps in saving.
In terms of macroeconometrics, the two hypotheses correspond to a regime-
shift versus a mis-spesification of the consumption function. In Norway, Brodin
and Nymoen (1989a, 1992) argue in favor of the mis-spesification hypothesis or
the house price explanation. They find that including in the aggregate consump-
tion function a wealth variable, which reflects the market value of housing, makes
the co-integrating relationship perform much better in the post-regulation pe-
riod. Using an extended sample period, Eitrheim, Jansen, and Nymoen (2002)
confirms the finding of a wealth elasticity in the range of 0.15-0.29. Other studies
that argue in favor of the house prices as the major explanation of the Norwe-
gian consumption boom are Lehmussaari (1990), Koskela and Virén (1992), and
Berg (1994).
Only a few papers have used micro data in studies of the eﬀects of deregula-
tion on household consumption1. In this paper I reevaluate the savings decline in
the mid-1980s using new micro data on household saving. I find that micro data
seems to support the hypothesis of a temporary readjustment following finan-
cial deregulation, rather than the wealth eﬀect hypothesis. The paper has three
main arguments for this interpretation. First, according to the data the decline
in saving started in 1983, a couple of years earlier than previously thought on
the basis of National Accounts data. The decline was caused by an exceptional
increase in expenditure on durables in 1983-85. The process of financial reform
does not give any clear cut information about when a consumption boom was
1 In the UK, Attanasio and Weber (1994) and Miles (1997) use expenditure surveys similar
to the data in this paper.
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likely to occur. On the other hand, indicators of credit supply to households do
not contradict the hypothesis that it started in 1983.
Second, theoretical implications of financial deregulation are confirmed in
the data. The transition from regulated to deregulated credit markets implies
a readjustment of saving and consumption of those households who were pre-
viously constrained. It is likely that the eﬀect would be strongest for young
to middle-aged households, and less so for older and retired households. The
micro data show that it was primarily young and middle-aged households who
increased their consumption in the ”first” part of the consumption boom (1983-
85), while all households shows high non-housing consumption rates in the ”sec-
ond” part of the boom (1986-87). As argued by Steigum (1992), credit financed
consumption was in this period also driven by general euphoria and bad banking
practices.
Finally, I test the hypothesis that households reacted to changes in wealth
stemming from a rapid increase in housing prices in 1985-86. According to this
hypothesis we would expect to find a diﬀerence between homeowners and non-
homeowners. There are no such diﬀerences in the data. Nor does the results
change if we omit from the sample those households who moved during the
period and thus had the opportunity to cash in gains on housing. However,
a wealth eﬀect through reversed mortgages may explain the savings slump of
older and retired households in the later part of the consumption boom.
The paper is organized as follows, Section 1 presents the aggregate micro
data on saving and consumption during the period and discuss the timing of
the deregulation in relation to the consumption boom. Section 2 illustrates the
theoretical implications of a deregulation, while Section 3 presents the regression
results. Section 4 looks at the alternative house price explanation, and Section 5
discuss how macroeconomic development and expectations about future incomes
may have interacted with the result of the deregulation. Finally, in Section 6
the results are summarized.
2 The decline in savings in the mid-1980s
According to the micro data, saving rates fell in 1983 and remained low rel-
ative to previous levels until 1988. I use data from the Survey of Consumer
Expenditures (SCE), as well as income data added from tax records in order to
determine saving as non-consumed income. Consumption include expenditures
on non-durables and durables. The income measure added to the survey data is
labor income including pensions, plus pure transfers, minus total taxes. Since
tax records have no information about transfers that are not subject to taxes,
such pure transfers are imputed from household characteristics. The income
measure does not include net capital income (see appendix A for details).
Figure 1 shows the sample aggregate saving rate with and without hous-
ing expenditures, the former represented by the dashed line and the latter
by the solid line. Housing expenditures generally consist of interest paid on
loans/mortgages, rent, fuel and maintenance. Since interest paid on mortgages
would be part of the income definition as negative income if capital income had
been included, it seems that the most consistent savings measure would be to
exclude housing expenditures. The median household may be interpreted as
the representative household, and is often used in micro studies because it is
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Figure 1: Sample aggregate, saving relative to labor income after tax
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less influenced than the mean by extreme values. However, the national aggre-
gate is aﬀected by extreme values and we would like a micro measure that is
comparable. Because of a large number of outliers and skewness of the micro
data, the mean saving rate is not fit for use (see appendix A). An alternative
concept of mean is average saving in percentage of average income in a given
period (or for a particular group). This is equal to total saving in percentage
of total labor income in the sample, thus aggregating on the sample instead of
the whole population.
According to the figure, sample aggregate saving rates fell in 1983 and re-
mained low relative to previous levels until 1988. The impression of a slump
in this period is reinforced by saving rates that are unusually high in 1982 and
in 1988. According to table A.3 in the appendix, mean and median income
after tax in the sample is exceptionally high in 1988 and exceptionally low in
1991. Likewise, the peak in 1982 is due to exceptionally low mean and median
consumer expenditures. On the other hand, table A.3 and figure 2 show that
the savings slump in 1983-87 has its counterpart in a marked increase in expen-
ditures on durables. Expenditures on durables are more than twice as high in
1983 compared to the previous five years, and remain high in 1984 and 1985.
There was a particular boom in car purchases in 1985.
As a consequence, the micro data indicate that household saving declined
two years earlier than previously thought on the basis of the National Accounts
aggregate saving rate. In the National Accounts, the aggregate saving fell 7
percentage points from 1984 to 1985, and declined even further in 1986 and
1987. After that, the aggregate saving rate gradually recovered. A comparison
of the two data series is discussed in more depth in Halvorsen (2003). The
diverging timing of the savings decline is independent of how saving is defined
with regards to net capital income and housing expenditures. However, for both
series, the decline is largely dependent on including durables in the consumption
concept and disregarding capital gains on real assets (see Moum and Nesbakken,
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Figure 2: Expenditures on durables as a fraction of total expenditures, mean
(solid line) and median (dashed line).
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1991, for a discussion). In Halvorsen (2003) I conclude that the remaining
dissimilarities may be caused by the way the National Accounts statistics are
adjusted by using several sources, or because the sample surveys may not be
completely representative. For instance, they may have an under-representation
of wealthy households.
Previous empirical work on the Norwegian consumption boom has used the
fall in 1985 of the National Accounts’ saving rate to time the eﬀect of financial
liberalization (see Brodin and Nymoen, 1989a, 1992, Boug, Mork and Tjem-
sland, 1995, and Eitrheim, Jansen and Nymoen, 2002). But, financial liber-
alization was a long process that started at the beginning of the decade and
proceeded in several steps.
2.1 Financial reform
The deregulation in Norway consisted mainly of the abolishment of direct regu-
lations in the credit market, thus limiting the government’s intervention. Prior
to the deregulation, Norway had a long history of regulated, low interest rates,
government involvement in the provision of subsidized mortgage loans, extensive
direct regulation of private banks, as well as regulation of international capital
movements. Low interest rates, high inflation and full deductibility of mortgage
interests gave borrowing incentives of households that were to a large extent
mitigated by credit rationing.
Grønvik (1992) describes the process as consisting of the following: A lib-
eralization of the bond market took place in several steps between 1982 and
1985, allowing more competition among banks and other lending institutions in
the housing and business markets. Furthermore, there were several reductions
in reserve requirements, ending with the primary reserve requirements being
abolished in 1987. The overall response of the banks was to increase lending
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Figure 3: Growth in credit to households.
-10 %
-5 %
0 %
5 %
10 %
15 %
20 %
25 %
30 %
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
Real growth in % of GDP
to households, and to compete for customers. According to Steigum (1992)
the deregulation triggered a competitive race among banks, and bad banking
practices were adopted in response to the increased competition in the credit
market. As an example of the expansionary bank behavior, he points to the fact
that from 1983 to 1986 the commercial banks in Norway increased their number
of branches by 15 percent, and the savings banks by 5.5 percent.According to
figure 3, the resulting growth in total credit to private households was particu-
larly high in 1984-87, with a peak in 1985, but on its way up already in 1982
and 1983.
As another part of the reform, there was a removal of the ceiling on deposit
rates in January 1978. After that, interest rates were regulated until 1980 when
the first ”interest rate declaration” was made. In this declaration, individual
institutions were allowed to adjust interest rates upwards when their rates were
lower than a commonly accepted national level. At the same time, the overall
interest rate level was allowed small increases. The declaration was changed
several times and eventually abolished in September 1985.
On its own, an interest liberalization tend to increase interest rates, and table
1 show how the real borrowing rate (an average of borrowing rates less inflation)
went from below zero to above 7 percent even before the final interest rate
declaration was abolished. Some of this increase was due to lower inflation, thus
the rise in nominal interest rates was smaller. After that, the rates continued
to increase until they reached their peak in 1992. In the second column of the
table we see that the after tax rate for average incomes was negative in the
beginning of the 1980s, approximately zero in 1983-1987, and around 5 percent
after 1987. Because of the high marginal income tax, the after tax rate was
negative until 1987 for high incomes. It follows that high income households
had an even stronger incentive to borrow and invest in real assets (or any asset
with a positive yield), and for a longer period.
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Table 1: Real interest rates
Before tax After-tax Lending Gray market
lending rate lending rate — deposit lending rate
(average inc.) wedge
1980 1.5 -5.1 5.1 2.9
1981 -0.4 -6.8 5.3 1.4
1982 2.5 -4.0 5.4 4.5
1983 5.4 -0.8 5.3 6.4
1984 7.2 0.9 4.5 7.6
1985 7.9 1.5 4.5 8.1
1986 8.9 1.1 5.7 7.8
1987 8.3 1.1 5.7 —
1988 10.1 3.3 6.1 —
1989 10.3 4.4 6.1 —
1990 10.6 4.6 5.8 —
1991 10.8 5.3 5.5 —
1992 12.0 7.3 5.2 —
1993 6.9 5.4 4.8 —
1994 7.0 4.5 4.1 —
Sources: Statistics Norway, Norges Bank and Moum (1989).
It would seem that the wedge between borrowing and lending rates is an
important piece of evidence on credit market imperfections (King, 1986, and
Hayashi, 1987)2. According to table 1, the wedge between nominal borrowing
rates and lending rates was somewhat lower in 1984 and 1985, at the time the
competition among banks became critical. In1986 the wedge is driven up again,
possibly because the competition led the banks to lower the fees charged on
services, in which case revenue from a wedge would be needed.
In the beginning of the 1980s, the credit rationing of households (and small
firms) gave market participants strong incentives to find ways to circumvent the
regulations by gray market operations. In fact, at the time, one of the arguments
in favor of liberalization was that the controls were not working as intended.
Little is documented about the eﬃcacy of the gray market at this time, but
Moum (1989) has estimated gray market interest rates. These are shown in
the last column of table 1. It seems there was a demand for credit in the gray
marked in the beginning of the 1980s, and that this was supplied at rates one or
two percentage points higher than the oﬃcial interest rates. However, by 1984,
the gray market interest rate is close to the oﬃcial level, which may indicate
that market participants were supplied suﬃciently elsewhere.
To summarize: according to the process of financial deregulation, indicators
of credit supply, and interest rate movements, there is nothing that contradicts
the hypothesis that the deregulation’s eﬀect on credit supply and demand took
eﬀect already in 1983.
2On the other hand, a wedge is also consistent with an equilibrium model of the credit
market with imperfect information or transaction costs.
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3 Theoretical implications of deregulation
This section discusses the eﬀects of financial deregulation, using the overlapping
generations framework, originally developed by Samuelson (1958) as the analyt-
ical basis. Consider a simple overlapping-generations model where households
live for three periods. Each period is assumed to be of equal length. Preferences
are given by
U = max
c

ln cyt + β ln cmt+1 + β2 ln cot+2

(1)
where β is the discount factor and

cyt , c
m
t+1, c
o
t+2

is consumption in young,
middle and old age. Households maximize utility subject to an intertemporal
budget constraint
cyt +
cmt+1
1 + r
+
cot+2
(1 + r)2
= wyt +
wmt+1
1 + r
+
wot+2
(1 + r)2
(2)
When households have access to perfect capital markets, optimal consumption
is
cyt = λt
cmt+1 = λtβ (1 + r) (3)
cot+2 = λtβ2 (1 + r)
2
where
λt =
1
1 + β + β2
%
wyt +
wmt+1
1 + r
+
wot+2
(1 + r)2
&
Thus, they want to consume in each period a fraction of discounted lifetime
resources. This is the traditional life-cycle/permanent income result.
3.1 Credit constraints
Let us first consider the position before financial liberalization. The initial,
financially repressive, regime is characterized by limited access of consumers to
financial intermediation. A simple way of thinking about this is to assume that
consumers are not allowed to become net debtors in this regime.
wyt − c
y
t ≥ 0
(wyt − c
y
t ) (1 + r) +

wmt+1 − cmt+1

≥ 0 (4)
For simplicity I have assumed a case where retirement income is zero

wot+2 = 0

.
When the borrowing constraints are binding, this is a corner solution, and in
this model, since wot+2 = 0, constraints cannot be binding in the second period.
Constraints can bind in the household’s first period. When credit constraints
are binding for a young household, the household will consume all of its current
resources, saving nothing.
In order for consumers to experience credit constraints they must initially
want to borrow, and there are two situations in which consumers typically would
want to borrow. One such situation is when consumers are impatient (β < 1).
Optimal consumption over the life cycle would then be falling, a plan that would
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typically call for borrowing in the early years. Another situation is when con-
sumers expect income growth. Also in this case would we expect young house-
holds to be constrained, but some more than others, depending on individual
expectations and career prospects.
If the borrowing constraint in (4) is binding the optimal solution will be
cyt = w
y
t
cmt+1 = µt (5)
cot+2 = µtβ (1 + r)
where
µt =
1
1 + βw
m
t+1
Note that, when the consumer is constrained in youth and wyt is relatively
small compared to the latter period, µ is greater than λ. In an example where in-
come in the first period is 1 and income in the second period is 8, and we simplify
by assuming r = 0 and β = 1, the optimal consumption path

cyt , c
m
t+1, c
o
t+2

will
be (1, 4, 4) , while in the unconstrained case the path would have been (3, 3, 3).
3.2 The transition to a deregulated economy
These results can be used to construct a savings function for the economy, and
hence to study how saving responds to a change from a constrained to a non-
constrained optimum. Let ny, nm and no be the number of young, middle
aged and old in the population. If we assume that all consumers face the same
income path, aggregate income is given by Wt = nyw
y
t + n
mwmt . When credit
constraints are binding for young households, then aggregate consumption and
saving can be written as
Ct = n
ywyt + n
mµt−1 + n
oβ (1 + r)µt−2 (6)
St = n
m

wmt − µt−1

− noβ (1 + r)µt−2 (7)
In equation (7), the behavior of the young has no eﬀect on aggregate saving,
since they are assumed to be constrained by equation (4). On the other hand,
changes in the current income of young households will have a proportionate
eﬀect on consumption. Aggregate saving depends on income of the middle-
aged alone (middle-aged and old if wo > 0), the wealth of the middle-aged and
old, defined as the present value of lifetime resources, and interest rates. After
financial deregulation, aggregate consumption and saving become
Ct = n
yλt + nmβ (1 + r)λt−1 + noβ2 (1 + r)2 λt−2 (8)
St = n
y (wyt − λt) + nm (wmt − β (1 + r)λt−1)− noβ2 (1 + r)
2 λt−2 (9)
In the unconstrained case, all generations aﬀect the behavior of aggregate sav-
ings, which now depend on current income, wealth (defined as the discounted
value of the full endowment stream), and interest rates. This implies that finan-
cial liberalization will result in an increase in the sensitivity of aggregate saving
to wealth, interest rates, and expectations about income, while consumption is
less sensitive to changes in current income.
With overlapping generations a regime change will have a gradual eﬀect in
the aggregate. To present a brief illustration of the transition, consider again
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the simple numerical example in the previous section. When young households
are given the opportunity to borrow as much as desired, they switch to the
unconstrained consumption path (3, 3, 3). However, for the middle-aged and old
households the liberalization has no eﬀect on behavior since they have already
been constrained from consuming as much as they wished when young, and are
still following the constrained path of (1, 4, 4). Thus, aggregate consumption is
1 + 4 + 4 = 9 in the constrained period, 3 + 4 + 4 = 11 in the first period of
the deregulation, 3 + 3 + 4 = 10 in the next, and finally in the third period all
generations are following the unconstrained consumption path yielding again
3 + 3 + 3 = 9 as aggregate consumption demand.
In this simple exercise above, the constraints were only binding for young
households as is commonly assumed. As argued in the previous section, Norway
constitutes a special case because of the strong incentives to borrow in the
pre-deregulation period. Consequently, constraints were possibly binding for
both young and middle-aged, causing all households to act as current income
consumers. A deregulation would then cause both young and middle-aged to
switch to a path with higher consumption, while only the consumption of the
old and retired would not react.
4 Young, middle-aged and old households
As discussed in the theoretical section, a deregulation of the credit market,
unleashing pent-up demand for consumer durables would first of all aﬀect young
and middle aged households. It was argued that older households would not
adjust their consumption since they are still following the constrained path.
Table 2 shows the outcome of estimating a general regression equation for
the saving rate by age group. The dependent variable is saving minus housing
expenditures as a fraction of labor income after tax. The variable is chosen
because, as argued before, mortgage interest will be strongly aﬀected by inter-
est rate changes for many homeowners, while the corresponding positive yields
from an interest rate increase is not included in the income concept. Young
households are defined as households with heads between 20 and 39 years old,
middle-aged as those between 40 and 65, and old as households with heads from
66 to 80 years old. The regression equation for the saving rate (sr) of household
i in the sample year p, can be written
srip = k0 + f (a) + η3Dp +Xiβ + κ
1
yip
+uip (10)
where k0 is a constant, f(a) is a function relating saving rate to age of the
household head, Dp is a set of year dummies, and X are household specific
variables we want to control for (employment status, area of residence, female
head, number of household heads, number of children, homeownership, month
of interview). Table 2 presents the estimated coeﬃcients ηˆ associated with the
period dummies. The full set of regressors are given in Appendix B. Since age is
the grouping variable, it is here included linearly in the regression. The inverse
of household labor income after tax

yip

is included because by construction sav-
ing rates become increasingly negative as income diminishes, yielding extreme
negative saving rates for households with incomes close to zero. The error term
uip is assumed to have a zero mean and a variance that is proportional to 1/y
i
p
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Table 2: Period dummies in saving rates eq. (11), two-stage WLS
Age 20-39 Age 40-65 Age 66-80 All ages
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
1977 0 0 0 0
1978 .021 (.022) .038 (.016) .058 (.024) .038 (.012)
1979 .026 (.021) .023 (.016) .018 (.026) .029 (.012)
1980 .036 (.021) .047 (.018) .059 (.030) .045 (.013)
1981 .019 (.020) .023 (.016) .057 (.024) .030 (.011)
1982 .030 (.020) .062 (.016) .033 (.025) .050 (.011)
1983 -.026 (.019) -.018 (.016) .015 (.026) -.013 (.011)
1984 .008 (.019) -.021 (.016) -.027 (.026) .002 (.011)
1985 -.025 (.019) -.010 (.016) .031 (.024) -.002 (.011)
1986 -.058 (.019) -.049 (.016) -.071 (.025) -.048 (.011)
1987 -.042 (.020) -.035 (.016) -.034 (.024) -.031 (.011)
1988 .070 (.019) .037 (.015) -.007 (.024) .062 (.011)
1989 .041 (.020) .009 (.017) -.049 (.026) .025 (.012)
1990 .037 (.020) .016 (.017) -.044 (.024) .034 (.011)
1991 .020 (.020) .013 (.017) -.037 (.024) .015 (.011)
1992 .027 (.018) .016 (.015) -.044 (.026) .024 (.010)
1993 .028 (.018) .056 (.015) -.044 (.026) .042 (.010)
1994 .033 (.018) .039 (.015) -.099 (.025) .035 (.010)
adj R2 .21 .17 .26 .18
Breusch∗ 47 23 69 110
χ2(2) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Kolmog.§ .10 .10 .13 .10
(p-value) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
No of obs 8655 10836 3542 23029
∗The Breusch-Pagan tests the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in (1/yi,1/y2i ).§The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests the null hypothesis of normality of std residuals.
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Table 3: Test* of diﬀerence between years
Age 20-39 Age 40-65 Age 66-80 All ages
ηˆ1982−ηˆ1983 8.55 20.71 0.38 28.21
(Pr > F) (0.0035) (<.0001) (0.5383) (<.0001)
ηˆ1985−ηˆ1986 3.60 5.71 14.85 16.86
(Pr > F) (0.0577) (0.0229) (0.0001) (<.0001)
* F test of the null hypothesis that diﬀerences are zero.
squared until a threshold level. Therefore the method of regression is a two-
stage weighted least squares where the first stage corrects for heteroskedasticity
with the following weights
wi =

y2 if y < ϕ
ϕ2 if y ≥ ϕ (11)
with ϕ = 350000 kroner, and the second stage trims the data for outliers with
applying weights as follows
w˜i =

1 if
 ri
σ
 ≤ 2
0 if
 ri
σ
 > 2 (12)
where ri is the residual from the first stage3.
4.1 Main regression results
According to tables 2 and 3, there is a statistically significant drop in saving rates
for young and middle aged households between 1982 and 1983, but not for older
households. The drop is 6 percentage points for young and 8 percentage points
for middle aged (and no more than 1 percentage point for older households).
As with the sample aggregate in section 2, the magnitude of the change seems
to be enlarged by the fact that the estimates in 1982 are unusually high. An
alternative is to compare with the period 1978-82, which is over all a stable
period. Taking the estimate in 1983 together with the average of the preceding
period we still find a significant drop, but now of 5 points for the young and 6
points for the middle-aged. All age groups show a further decline in saving in
1986, however, the drop is this time only statistically significant for households
above 66 years of age. Looking at the consumption data, all age groups have
very high consumption of durables in 1983, 1984 and 1985, cars in particular,
and even for the very old. But as table 2 shows, the increase in durables relative
to labor income is strongest for young and middle-aged. On the other hand,
old households reduce their saving rates with 6 percentage points from 1982 to
1984, even though the year to year diﬀerence is insignificant.
The drop in saving rates for old households in 1986 is surprisingly large, 10
percentage points. I can think of two reasons for this. One is the omission of
3This method produces generally the same results as other methods of robust estimation,
such as least absolute deviation (LAV) or least median squares (LMS), shown on the same
dataset in Halvorsen (2002).
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Table 4: Selected variables and dummies in saving rates eq. (11)
Age 20-39 Age 40-65 Age 66-80 All ages
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Age/10 -.029 (.008) .047 (.005) .104 (.012) .030 (.002)
No of children -.027 (.008) -.076 (.007) -.187 (.036) -.071 (.004)
Single head .225 (.016) .245 (.016) .178 (.016) .210 (.010)
Mult. heads -.014 (.022) -.084 (.007) -.051 (.012) -.091 (.006)
Female head -.002 (.009) .018 (.010) .054 (.014) .021 (.006)
Self-employed -.037 (.011) .005 (.008) -.002 (.017) -.020 (.006)
Homeowner .006 (.008) -.021 (.009) -.024 (.012) -.012 (.005)
Spars. pop. area .052 (.010) .096 (.009) .153 (.014) .090 (.006)
adj R2 .21 .17 .26 .18
No of obs 8655 10836 3542 23029
net capital income, which is known from income statistics is on average positive
for households with heads older than about 50 years of age. Generally, the
omission of net capital income gives saving rates for young households that are
too high and saving rates of old households that are too low and the diﬀerence is
increased after 1982 with higher interest rates. The omission of capital incomes
is surely the main explanation of why the estimated time dummy coeﬃcients
for old households stay negative after 19864. The other reason is that when
interest rates go up, the user cost of housing will by definition go up. The
substitution eﬀect will shift consumption towards non-housing consumption.
Higher user costs also constitutes a negative income eﬀect, but in the case of
older households this is probably small compared to the positive income eﬀect
of higher interest rates on financial wealth as discussed above (and income from
housing).
4.2 Controls
Some selected controls are given in table 4, while the rest are given in appendix
B. The estimates for the controls reveal a powerful impact of age and demo-
graphic composition of the household upon the saving rate. Saving decrease
with age when in the young age-group, increase with age when in the middle-
age-group and increase strongly with age in the oldest age-group (age eﬀects
versus birth cohort eﬀects are discussed in more detail in Halvorsen, 2002). The
number of children in the household has a significantly negative eﬀect on house-
hold saving. Note that the coeﬃcient increases with the age of the household,
and thus age of the child. It seems that older children are more expensive. The
dummy for single head has a surprisingly large positive coeﬃcient in all age
groups. Female head probably correlates with single head for old households,
4This eﬀect is even more obvious when the results are grouped by households above and
below 50 years of age. However, the main results do not change with another grouping of the
age variable.
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Table 5: Results with housing expenditures included, or simple OLS
+ Housing expenditures Ordinary Least Squares
20-39 40-65 66-80 20-39 40-65 66-80 All∗
1981 -.016 .021 .072 .021 -.010 .004 .030
1982 .012 .061 .033 .037 .022 .042 .050
1983 -.068 -.028 .028 -.067 -.073 -.036 -.013
1984 -.058 -.047 -.022 -.007 -.073 -.107 .002
1985 -.094 -.043 .030 -.074 -.024 -.004 -.002
1986 -.131 -.090 -.110 -.093 -.060 -.088 -.048
1987 -.150 -.094 -.073 -.068 -.061 -.036 -.031
1988 -.029 -.018 -.032 .046 .024 .006 .062
1989 -.088 -.089 -.074 .040 .030 .015 .025
1990 -.079 -.067 -.088 .066 .064 .014 .034
Av SE§ .02 .02 .03 .04 .03 .06 .01
Adj R2 .22 .19 .29 .40 .36 .49 .18
Dep mean .09 .17 .34 .07 .15 .20 .31
Breusch.† 1534 2422 823 110
χ2(2) <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Kolmog.‡ .14 .14 .16 .10
(p-value) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
∗From table (2); WLS excluding housing expenditures.§Since standard errors
are approxiomately the same for all coeﬃcients, only the average is reported.
†Breusch-Pagan test the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in (1/yi,1/y2i ).‡Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests the null hypothesis of normality of std residuals.
which may explain the positive coeﬃcient. Self-employed head is significantly
negative for young households (positive but not significant for the rest). The
impact of region increase with age-group. For all households we have that a
household in one of the major cities (Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim) has on aver-
age about 9 percentage points lower saving rate than a household with similar
characteristics in sparsely populated areas. For old households the diﬀerence is
15 percentage points, while it is only 5 percentage points for young households.
4.3 Including housing expenditures
The dummy for homeownership in table 4 show that older homeowners save
less and have higher non-housing consumption than younger homeowners. As
mentioned before, positive capital income such as dividends and yields from
financial wealth is not identified in the tax records used here, while the major
part of negative capital income, interest on mortgages is reported in the house-
hold expenditure surveys as a part of housing expenditure. Thus, the point
about young households having too high saving rates is illustrated in table 5,
which shows the results when housing expenditures are included in the savings
definition. We see that the saving rates of young households are lowered quite
substantially compared to table 2 and declines after 1982. However, housing
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expenditures increased for all age groups, aﬀecting the coeﬃcients of the pe-
riod dummies. Housing expenditure correlates strongly with two other controls;
region and homeownership. The diﬀerence in saving rates between households
living in major cities and households living in scarcely inhabited areas is larger
when housing expenditures are included.
4.4 Robustness of the results
Since the regression method used in estimating equation (11) gives little weight
to low income household, the outcome is closer to a median regression rather
than a mean regression. For comparison, table 5 presents the simple OLS es-
timates. The OLS results for coeﬃcients accentuate the savings drop in 1983
and 1984, in particular for middle-aged households, but also for old households.
On the other hand, standard errors are large and the heteroskedastisity tests
reported in the lower part of the table show that the estimates are ineﬃcient.
The test statistics for the two-stage weighted least squares in the last column
of the table indicate that heteroskedasticity is less. Also the normality test sta-
tistic (Kolmogorov-Smirnov) is somewhat reduced in the preferred regression
method.
5 The wealth eﬀect?
According to the life-cycle/permanent income theory, a forward-looking opti-
mizing consumer will consume the annuity value of his human and non-human
wealth. Non-human wealth is financial and real assets, and for most households,
housing is by far the most important real asset. In an influential study, Muell-
bauer and Murphy (1990) argue that the increase in the average propensity to
consume in the United Kingdom can be explained mainly by the surge in house
prices in the mid-eighties coupled with the financial liberalization of the early
eighties:
”with the sharp rise in house prices, residential property became
more than half of personal sector wealth. Financial liberalization
allowed households to cash it in as consumer expenditure financed
by borrowing”. Muellbauer and Murphy (1990)
This view, coupled with the opinion that the housing market in the late 1980s
was aﬀected by irrational behavior and extrapolative expectations, implies that
the high level of consumption was unwarranted and thus cause for concern for
UK external equilibrium.
In the period 1985-87, and partly because of a deregulation of the housing
market (see Moum, 1991, for details), we saw a sharp rise in Norwegian house
prices. The growth in real house prices is shown in table 6. At the time there
was no established price statistics, but a rough index was published by the
Norwegian Association of Real Estate Agents (NEF)/Econ, and is presented in
the first column of the table. The second column show the average per m2 price
statistics that eventually took over as the oﬃcial statistic from NEF/Econ. The
last two columns refer to calculations done by Moum (1989), who pointed out
that the real house price appreciation was much stronger for houses with higher
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Table 6: Real growth in house prices
Index∗ Price∗ Value of house in 1987-kr§
1980=100 per m2 12 million 1
1
2 million
1981 1 — -9 -28
1982 -2 — -6 -17
1983 -8 — -6 -17
1984 -4 — -4 -12
1985 11 — 6 18
1986 8 — 11 32
1987 3 13 5 14
1988 -1 -7 0 0
1989 -12 -16 — —
1990 -11 -12 — —
∗Norwegian Association of Real Estate Agents (NEF)/Econ
§Moum (1989), growth given in 1000 1987-kroner.
real value (as measured in 1987). Although there are large diﬀerences between
the measures, the boom in house prices in 1985 and 1986 is evident.
It can be shown that there are two eﬀects of higher house prices on expendi-
ture. One is a positive wealth eﬀect for those with housing wealth, and the other
is a negative price eﬀect. A positive wealth eﬀect can occur either though mov-
ing to a smaller dwelling, and thereby have an opportunity to consume out of
realized capital gains, or through reversed mortgages, i.e. general loans backed
up by housing collateral. The price eﬀect is a combination of an income and
substitution eﬀect from facing higher user costs on housing. For those without
housing wealth, there is no wealth eﬀect so that the negative price eﬀect dom-
inates. Anyhow, we would expect to find a wealth eﬀect for homeowners only,
and the eﬀect should be stronger for homeowners with relatively large dwellings,
given that there is a strong correlation between the size and value of a house.
On the other hand, one might expect non-homeowners to save more when real
house prices rise. Their saving would also depend on the size of the required
deposit as a proportion of the prize of a house when obtaining a mortgage.
5.1 Regression results
The regression result for the saving rate when housing expenditures is omitted,
is presented in table 7. The regression is done for three subgroups, and home-
owner households in dwellings larger than net 100m2, homeowner households
in dwellings smaller than or equal to net 100m2, and tenant households. Net
100m2 is the median size of all dwellings in the sample5. We see that with
standard errors of approximately .02 there is no statistically significant diﬀer-
ence (at conventional levels) between the owners and tenants. In particular,
the decline in savings in 1985-87 does not seem to be stronger for owners with
large dwellings. Actually, it is tenants who show the greatest drop in savings,
5 I have experimented with other sizes as grouping criteria. The general result is that size
correlates positively with saving rates, whereas the results concerning development over time
does not change.
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Table 7: Saving rate regressions by ownership and size of house
Homeowners Tenants All
100+ 100-
1977 0 0 0 0
1978 .050 (.019) .028 (.021) .010 (.019) .034 (.011)
1979 .012 (.019) .035 (.021) .025 (.018) .028 (.011)
1980 .048 (.021) .036 (.023) .048 (.020) .046 (.012)
1981 .032 (.018) .021 (.021) .021 (.018) .026 (.011)
1982 .057 (.018) .017 (.021) .057 (.019) .047 (.011)
1983 -.028 (.018) -.011 (.021) -.003 (.019) -.017 (.011)
1984 -.020 (.018) .002 (.022) .027 (.020) -.005 (.011)
1985 -.003 (.017) -.061 (.022) .038 (.019) -.011 (.010)
1986 -.041 (.017) -.087 (.019) -.099 (.020) -.058 (.010)
1987 -.036 (.017) -.033 (.020) -.065 (.019) -.039 (.011)
1988 .054 (.016) .039 (.019) .033 (.020) .049 (.010)
1989 .016 (.017) .002 (.020) -.009 (.019) .018 (.011)
1990 .023 (.017) .027 (.020) .053 (.019) .020 (.011)
1991 .017 (.017) -.015 (.021) -.010 (.020) .008 (.011)
1992 .035 (.016) -.011 (.019) -.026 (.018) .017 (.010)
1993 .051 (.016) .000 (.020) .040 (.018) .036 (.010)
1994 .031 (.015) .011 (.020) .054 (.020) .028 (.010)
Adj R2 .24 .27 .23 .19
No of obs 10577 6368 5158 23041
Standard errors in parenthesis.
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or increase in non-housing consumption, in this period. According to the esti-
mates, their saving rates fell on average by 14 percentage points. On the other
hand, owners with large dwellings display the largest drop in savings in 1983, a
period with apparently stable house prices. Owners with smaller dwellings have
the largest consumption response in 1985-87. The fact that tenants increase
their non-housing consumption more than homeowners in 1986 suggests that
the house price eﬀect was not very strong.
According to the wealth eﬀect hypothesis, we expect a decrease in the value
of housing to reduce consumption symmetrically. The subsequent decline in
house prices in 1989-92 should imply reduced consumption and higher savings
for homeowners (and more for homeowners with large dwellings). The estimates
do not indicate any such response in the years 1989-92. In this period there are
no particular changes in saving rates over time and across groups. Neither is
there any decline in saving rates in 1993-94, when house prices started to grow
again.
5.2 Consuming out of capital gains on housing?
To what degree do people ”cash in” capital gain on housing? Young and middle-
aged households will most likely use any gains to invest in a bigger dwelling,
thus incurring higher user costs on housing and possibly a temporary increase
in purchases of durables. Older households are likely to be in a position to sell
and downsize, and use the capital gain on consumption of non-housing items.
Yet, we know by experience that older households experience large transaction
costs connected with moving and also do not see the need for using the extra
gain on own consumption6. They would rather see the increase in wealth as
extra security and higher value of a possible bequest. Also, what is a gain
from rising house prices for some will be a loss for others (first-time buyers or
younger households that feel they should save in order to acquire a house later)
so theoretically the eﬀect on the aggregate is uncertain.
Based on the discussion above, we might expect to see the wealth eﬀect
to be indeterminate or positive for younger households, negative for middle-
aged households, and slightly negative for old households. As seen from the
regression results by age group in table 4, the dummy for homeowners has this
expected eﬀect, positive but insignificant for young households, significantly
negative for middle-aged, and negative for older households (but only significant
at the 10% level). However, we would also expect that a house price eﬀect was
a result of households moving. Although the data is not a panel, it does contain
information on when the household moved into their current dwelling. I used
this information in order to restrict the sample to households who had stayed
in the same house since 1982. Empirically, omitting from the sample those who
have moved after 1982 does not change the main results. The only change is in
1986-87, a slight decrease in saving rates for the less than 100m2 homeowners,
and a slight increase in saving rates of tenants. Such small changes in the results
do not support the ”cashing in” or even ”settling in” eﬀect of increased housing
wealth.
6For a study on US data, see Venti and Wise (2001) who conclude that, on average, home
equity is not liquidated to support non-housing consumption as households age.
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5.3 Reversed mortgages
Reversed mortgages is the way to consume out of increased housing wealth
without moving. According to Muellbauer and Murphy (1990), reversed mort-
gages was important in explaining the UK consumption boom because increased
availability of reversed mortgages, in particular for older households, was one
of the factors in the financial liberalization. In one of the few papers that use
micro data, Attanasio and Weber (1994), find that the house price explana-
tion accounts for much of the increase in consumption of older cohorts, but the
argue that most of the increase in macro consumption in the UK was due to
younger cohorts with revised perception of life-time labor income. In section
4.1. I discussed the surprisingly large drop in saving rates for old households in
1986. Reversed mortgages may explain much of the shift down in non-housing
consumption of older households in 1986-87.
5.4 Causality and data problems
A problem with interpreting the drop in savings as a wealth eﬀect is the issue
of causality. Consider that increased credit supply leads to temporary read-
justment and increased demand for durables, and housing, in particular, among
young and middle-aged households. An increase in consumption demand leads
to an increase in the prices and values of assets whose supply is rather inelastic,
such as housing prices and housing wealth. This appears in the data as a sta-
tistical correlation, but does not necessarily justify a causal relationship from
housing wealth to consumption. On the basis of Norwegian National Accounts
data, this has aready been argued by Skjæveland (1989) and Magnussen and
Moum (1992) in response to the arguments in favor of the house price hypothe-
sis provided by Brodin (1988), Brodin and Nymoen (1989b), and Jansen (1992).
Magnussen and Moum (1992) also point to the fact that there are essentially
no good data on house prices in the 1980s. Statistics Norway did not begin to
publish independent price statistics by region and type of dwelling until 1991.
Table 6 show that there are considerable diﬀerences between the available price
indicators.
6 Permanent income expectations
In section 3 it was shown that a transition from credit constrained to an un-
constrained regime would induce an increase in the consumption of the young
(and middle-aged, depending on the nature of rationing), but no increase in the
consumption of the old. A similar pattern will emerge in the case of expec-
tations about higher permanent income. According to the permanent income
hypothesis, consumption will be proportional to the annuity value of the sum
of nonhuman wealth and the present discounted value of expected future in-
come. If income is expected to rise, and the permanent income hypothesis is
true, consumption should rise now, financed by borrowing or running down as-
sets, so that in either case net assets should fall. It can be shown within the
framework of a simple life-cycle model (as it has been shown by Attanasio and
Weber, 1994), that expectations about a permanent increase in lifetime income
will have a larger eﬀect the younger the household since they will have more
periods of expected higher income to consume out of than an older household.
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Attanasio and Weber (1994) use this argument to show that the British con-
sumption boom in late 1980s can be explained as expectations about higher
income7. Linking several cross-section by cohort they argue against the wealth
eﬀect hypothesis by showing that after several dummies for housing wealth is
included, much of the consumption increase is explained for the older cohorts
but remains unexplained for younger cohorts.
There is little explicit information about people’s income expectations, and
none on the expectations of Norwegian households in the mid-eighties. The
ex-post development in real income provides little basis for expectations ex-
ante. Considering the general economic situation, we know that growth in
GDP was very high (above 4 percent) in the period 1983-86; unemployment
was gradually declining since the beginning of 1983 (not increasing until 1988)
and was historically low in 1986 and 1987. Much of this prosperity was due to
high oil prices - Brent Blend was at 30-40$ per barrel throughout the period
1979-85. Whether Norwegian households perceived this period of opulence as
permanent or transitory is a question of people’s understanding of the economy
and the way they form expectations about the future, but it is reasonable to
expect that Norwegian households were pretty optimistic and had high hopes
for the future. In view of the description of the economy above, such optimism
could contribute to a consumption boom in both 1983-84 and 1985-87, but most
likely in the latter period despite the oil shock of 1986.
In 1981, the Labor Party initiated a relief in income taxes, an initiative that
naturally was continued when the Conservative Party went into government
later that year. According to Bowitz and Hove (1996), marginal income taxes
were reduced from 44 percent to 38 percent, while average income taxes were
reduced from 27 percent to 23 percent from 1981 to 1984 (in 1988 both were
back at the 1981-level). Thus, both marginal and average income taxes were
significantly reduced, but marginal taxes were reduced more than average taxes.
It is not impossible that households perceived this tax reduction as a permanent
change that would give permanently higher after tax income. The tax relief
came earlier than the general economic boom, thus making it more likely to
have contributed to consumption growth in 1983.
Though the hypothesis that permanent income expectations caused the con-
sumption boom is plausible, and certainly did contribute to the overall increase
in consumption, it is diﬃcult to asses the hypothesis empirically and it is con-
sidered beyond the scope of this paper to do so. Likewise, there may have been
speculation, irrational behavior and bandwagon eﬀects during the boom. On
the other hand, such phenomena are usually characteristcs of the later part
of economic booms, and it is my opinion that they do not interfer with the
conclusions considering the early part of the consumption boom.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I argue that there was a particular situation in Norway prior to the
liberalization in the 1980s, because Norway had a long history of regulated, low
interest rates, extensive direct regulation of private banks, as well as regulation
of international capital movements. At the same time, a combination of nega-
tive after-tax real interest rates and full tax deductibility for mortgage interest
7 See also King (1990) and Pagano (990).
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made it optimal for all households to borrow. These borrowing incentives were
to a large extent mitigated by credit rationing. According to theory, it is likely
that young and middle-aged households were those primarily aﬀected by credit
constraints and would be more aﬀected by deregulation than older and retired
households. I find that micro data support the hypothesis of a temporary read-
justment following financial deregulation. According to the data the decline in
saving started in 1983, a couple of years earlier than previously thought on the
basis of National Accounts data. The decline was caused by an exceptional in-
crease in expenditure on durables in 1983-85. The micro data show that it was
primarily young and middle-aged households who increased their consumption
in the ”first” part of the consumption boom (1983-85), while all households
shows high non-housing consumption rates in the ”second” part of the boom
(1986-87). The rise in house prices in 1985-86 may have been an important de-
terminant of older and retired households’ consumption in the 1986-97 through
reversed mortgages, but cannot on its own explain the decline in savings and
boom in durables purchases that started in 1983.
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A Appendix: Detailed description of the data
The main data source is the Norwegian Survey of Consumer Expenditures
(SCE). The Survey of Consumer Expenditures is an annual survey based on
two weeks of expenditure accounting, with additional interviews. The interviews
collect information on household characteristics, such as age and employment
status of all members of the household, and expenditures that may not be prop-
erly covered by a two week accounting like durables and annual expenses. Thus
total consumption expenditure consists of payments of the household during
the accounting period, converted to figures for a whole year through multiply-
ing with 26, together with the housing expenses and consumer durable purchases
recorded in the interview. A household is defined as persons having a common
dwelling and sharing at least one meal per day. Institutions are not included.
Sample weights are based on non-response rates by region, household size, and
time of interview.
To the survey I have added income data from tax records. The tax records
from this period have information on net income after deductions in income
(thus yielding the tax base), and taxes. It is not possible to correctly identify net
income before deductions. However, the tax record do have information about
labor income (including labor income from self-employment) and pensions. The
definition of saving is therefore
Saving = (wage income + income from self-employment + pensions - taxes)
+ imputed transfers - total consumer expenditures.
Imputed transfers are child benefits and student scholarships. Number and age
of children is used to calculate child benefits, and if there are full-time students
in the household, these are assumed to have a full student scholarship. If we
had been able to do identify net capital income, it would for most households
consist of dividends from financial wealth and interest paid on mortgages. In
the household survey data, consumption of housing services generally consists of
interest paid on loans/mortgages, rent, fuel, and maintenance. So, interest paid
on mortgages is part of the expenditures definition and thus already registered.
Moreover, the corresponding positive income from real wealth, i.e. imputed
income from owner occupied housing, is inadequately registered for tax reasons.
A source of variation is the lack of exact correspondence between income and
consumption. While income refers to the year of observation, consumer expen-
ditures depends on when the household has been interviewed. In the interview,
questions about expenditures on durables are phrased ”purchased in the past
12 months”. An interview done in January will record expenditures on durables
in the current year that were actually made in the year before. A correspon-
dence problem is also attended with the procedure of ”blowing up” two weeks
of expenditures that the interviewed households have accounted for to one year.
Households interviewed in December will in most cases yield an observation of
a much higher yearly expenditure, when the two weeks are multiplied by 26,
than other households with the same yearly income interviewed at an earlier
date. As a consequence, dummies for month of interview has been included in
the regressions.
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Table A.1 Household saving rates
Mean S¯/Y¯ excl. No of
(sr) Std. dev. Median S¯/Y¯ housing obs.
1975 -0.74 7.56 0.12 — — 1036
1976 -0.52 6.76 0.15 — — 1076
1977 -0.69 7.18 0.10 — — 921
1978 -0.56 5.50 0.17 0.09 0.20 1396
1979 -0.31 3.31 0.16 0.10 0.21 1368
1980 -0.11 1.78 0.14 0.09 0.22 1046
1981 -0.33 7.25 0.18 0.11 0.23 1448
1982 -1.05 15.76 0.19 0.14 0.25 1380
1983 -0.40 4.18 0.12 0.05 0.17 1406
1984 -0.65 6.46 0.10 0.03 0.18 1396
1985 -0.41 5.43 0.11 0.04 0.19 1425
1986 -0.86 18.06 0.07 -0.02 0.14 1416
1987 -0.22 1.96 0.07 0.00 0.18 1208
1988 -0.05 1.27 0.19 0.07 0.26 1379
1989 -0.01 0.85 0.13 0.05 0.26 1171
1990 0.02 0.74 0.15 0.09 0.28 1201
1991 -0.12 1.37 0.10 0.04 0.26 1284
1992 0.01 0.64 0.13 0.09 0.29 1387
1993 0.02 1.11 0.18 0.16 0.33 1306
1994 0.04 0.95 0.20 0.17 0.33 1334
Source: Author’s calculations using the SCE and tax records
Table A.2 Real income and expenditures, in 1998-kroner.
Labor income Consumer expenditures
after tax* Total Durables Housing No of
Year Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median obs.
1978 199289 185688 180234 150409 29018 22793 21173 19647 1396
1979 199833 186503 180733 151560 25902 18358 23006 20822 1368
1980 199027 185851 180702 150673 25683 20064 25403 22123 1046
1981 209255 201316 185488 158755 26238 19514 24597 23020 1448
1982 208390 195547 178500 159933 24154 23156 23164 24935 1380
1983 207852 193946 197987 171802 59398 53483 25442 26685 1406
1984 211353 195741 202870 172015 52213 41782 28928 27859 1396
1985 219303 207764 209794 179872 56338 45064 32346 30242 1425
1986 215060 204581 219381 186673 37437 29391 36694 33606 1479
1987 222067 209574 222042 190599 36845 36112 40545 35152 1481
1988 249544 229464 219539 184755 28043 22664 45895 40571 1417
1989 225379 212264 213036 183561 24562 22699 46446 44443 1171
1990 227142 207299 207387 176879 23082 20749 44780 40735 1201
1991 222322 201931 219542 186173 26124 19441 46772 47316 1284
1992 244854 226438 221669 187883 24368 20030 48099 43551 1387
1993 252767 225301 212797 182643 25393 24007 43667 42446 1308
1994 261302 238511 218172 186954 26229 19955 43049 39891 1334
* Labor income including pensions.
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Table A.3 Real income and expenditures, index 1978 = 100
Labor income Consumer expenditures
after tax* Total Durables Housing
Year Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1978 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1979 100 100 100 101 89 81 109 106
1980 100 100 100 100 89 88 120 113
1981 105 108 103 106 90 86 116 117
1982 105 105 99 106 83 102 109 127
1983 104 104 110 114 205 235 120 136
1984 106 105 113 114 180 183 137 142
1985 110 112 116 120 194 198 153 154
1986 108 110 122 124 129 129 173 171
1987 111 113 123 127 127 158 191 179
1988 125 124 122 123 97 99 217 207
1989 113 114 118 122 85 100 219 226
1990 114 112 115 118 80 91 211 207
1991 112 109 122 124 90 85 221 241
1992 123 122 123 125 84 88 227 222
1993 127 121 118 121 88 105 206 216
1994 131 128 121 124 90 88 203 203
*Labor income including pensions.
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B Appendix: Regression results for all controls
Age of household head
20-39 40-65 66-80 All
Intercept .552 (.023) .537 (.019) .359 (.043) .553 (.012)
1/yi -89312 -77514 -61023 -71229
Age/10 -.029 (.008) .047 (.005) .104 (.012) .030 (.002)
No of children -.027 (.008) -.076 (.007) -.187 (.036) -.071 (.004)
(No of children)2 .001 (.001) .008 (.001) .031 (.018) .008 (.001)
Single head .225 (.016) .245 (.016) .178 (.016) .210 (.010)
Multiple heads -.014 (.022) -.084 (.006) -.051 (.012) -.091 (.006)
Female head -.002 (.008) .018 (.0010) .054 (.014) .021 (.006)
Self-employed head -.037 (.011) .005 (.008) -.002 (.017) -.020 (.006)
Self-employed spouse .008 (.015) .014 (.012) -.011 (.025) .009 (.009)
Rural area (spars.pop.) .052 (.010) .096 (.009) .153 (.014) .090 (.006)
Rural area (dens.pop.) .007 (.008) .040 (.007) .084 (.012) .030 (.005)
Homeowner .006 (.008) -.021 (.009) -.024 (.012) -.012 (.005)
January .119 (.014) .097 (.013) .104 (.022) .110 (.009)
February .061 (.015) .067 (.013) .064 (.023) .063 (.008)
March .073 (.015) .048 (.013) .054 (.024) .058 (.009)
April .047 (.015) .070 (.013) .089 (.023) .063 (.009)
May .028 (.015) .011 (.013) .061 (.024) .026 (.009)
June .007 (.015) .006 (.013) .003 (.024) .006 (.009)
July .007 (.015) .011 (.013) .001 (.023) .009 (.009)
August 0 0 0 0
September .009 (.015) -.012 (.013) -.016 (.023) -.003 (.009)
October -.010 (.015) -.023 (.013) -.017 (.024) -.018 (.009)
November -.009 (.015) .011 (.013) .021 (.024) .005 (.009)
December -.173 (.016) -.117 (0.14) -.083 (.024) -.128 (.009)
Dummies for year All reported in table (2)
Standard errors in parenthesis. The dummies are normalized on a household with
two adults and a male household head, one who is a wage earner, and resides as a
tenant in one of the major cities (Oslo, Bergen or Trondheim), and doing the the two
weeks of consumer expenditure reporting in August.
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